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Abstract.   The paper addresses a standard line of criticism of the Computational 
Theory of Mind (CTM), based on the claim that the notion of realizing a 
computational formalism is overly liberal to the point of vacuity. I argue that even for 
interesting and powerful cases, realization is essentially a matter of approximation and 
degree, and interpreting a physical device as performing a computation is always 
relative to our purposes and potential epistemic gains. However, while this may 
fatally undermine a computational explanation of conscious experience, I contend 
that, contra Putnam and Searle, it does not rule out the possibility of a scientifically 
defensible account of propositional attitude states in computational terms. 
Keywords:  computational theory of mind; multiple realizability; consciousness; 
propositional attitudes. 
1.     Introduction 
Central to the theory of computation is the intuitive notion of an effective or 
‘mechanical’ procedure, which is simply a finite set of instructions for syntactic 
manipulations that can be followed by a machine, or by a human being who is capable 
of carrying out only very elementary operations on symbols. A key constraint is that 
the machine or the human can follow the rules without knowing what the symbols 
mean. The notion of an effective procedure is obviously quite general – it doesn’t 
specify what form the instructions should take, what the manipulated symbols should 
look like, nor precisely what manipulations are involved. The underlying restriction is 
simply that they are finitary and can proceed ‘mindlessly’ i.e. without any additional 
interpretation or understanding. So there are any number of different possible 
frameworks for filling in the details and making the notion rigorous and precise. 
Turing’s ‘automatic computing machines’ [1] (TMs), supply a very intuitive and 
elegant rendition of the notion of an effective procedure, and in the ensuing discussion 
TMs will be taken as the conceptual archetype. But there is a variety of well known 
alternative frameworks, including Church’s Lambda Calculus, Gödel’s Recursive 
Function Theory, Lambek’s Infinite Abacus Machines, etc.  
 
Turing machines and other types of computational formalisms are mathematical 
abstractions. Like equations, sets, Euclid’s perfectly straight lines, etc., TMs don’t 
exist in physical time or space, and they have no causal powers. In order to perform 
2 
 
actual computations, an abstract Turing machine, thought of as a formal program of 
instructions, must be realized or instantiated by a suitable arrangement of matter and 
energy. And as Turing observed long ago [2], there is no privileged or unique way to 
do this. Like other abstract structures, such as chess games and isosceles triangles, 
Turing machines are multiply realizable - what unites different types of physical 
implementation of the same abstract TM is nothing that they have in common as 
physical systems, but rather a structural isomorphism characterized at a higher level 
of description. Hence it’s possible to implement the very same computational 
formalism using modern electronic circuitry, a human being executing the instructions 
by hand with paper and pencil, a Victorian system of gears and levers, as well as more 
atypical arrangements of matter and energy including toilet paper and beer cans. Let 
us call this ‘downward’ multiple realizability, wherein, for any given formal 
procedure, this same abstract computational formalism can be implemented via an 
arbitrarily large number of distinct physical systems. And let us denote this type of 
downward multiple realizability as ‘↓MR’.  
 
After the essential foundations of the mathematical theory of computation were laid, 
the vital issue then became one of engineering – how best to utilize state of the art 
technology to construct rapid and powerful physical implementations of the abstract 
mathematical blueprints, and hence perform actual high speed computations 
automatically. This is a clear and deliberate ↓MR endeavour, involving the intentional 
construction of artefacts, painstakingly devised to instantiate the algorithms that we 
have created. From this top-down perspective, there is an obvious and pragmatically 
indispensible sense in which the hardware that we have designed and built can be said 
to perform genuine computations in physical space-time.    
2.    The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) 
According to the widely embraced ‘computational paradigm’, which underpins 
cognitive science, Strong AI and various allied positions in the philosophy of mind, 
computation (of one sort or another) is held to provide the scientific key to explaining 
mentality and, ultimately, to reproducing it artificially. The paradigm maintains that 
cognitive processes are essentially computational processes, and hence that 
intelligence in the physical world arises when a material system implements the 
appropriate kind of computational formalism. In terms of the classical model of 
computation as rule governed symbol manipulation, the relation between the abstract 
program level and its realization in physical hardware then yields an elegant solution 
to the traditional mind-body problem in philosophy: the mind is to the brain as a 
program is to the hardware of a digital computer.  
 
On the CTM view, mental states and properties are seen as complex internal 
processing states, which computationally interact within a formal structure of internal 
state transitions, thereby mediating the inputs and outputs of  intelligent behaviour. 
Hence any mental process leading to an action will have to be embodied as a physical 
brain process that realizes the underlying computational formalism. A perceived 
virtue of this approach is that it can potentially provide a universal theory of 
cognition, a theory which is not limited by the details and idiosyncrasies of the human 
organism. Since mentality is explained in computational terms, and, as above, 
computational formalisms are multiply realizable, it follows that the mind-program 
analogy can be applied to any number of different types of creatures and agents. 
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Combining CTM with ↓MR, it follows that a human, a Martian and a robot could all 
be in exactly the same mental state, where this sameness is captured in terms of 
implementing the same cognitive computation, albeit via radically different forms of 
physical hardware. So on this view, computation is seen as providing the scientific 
paradigm for explaining mentality in general – all cognition is to be literally described 
and understood in computational terms.   
 
But rather than welcoming multiple realizability as a theoretical virtue promising a 
universal account of mentality, various opponents of CTM target this feature as its 
Achilles heel. In Representation and Reality, Hilary Putnam [3] argues that 
implementing a computational formalism cannot serve as the theoretical criterion of 
mentality, because such a standard is overly liberal to the point of vacuity. As a case 
in point he offers a proof of the thesis that every open physical system can be 
interpreted as the realization of every finite state automaton. In a related vein, John 
Searle [4] argues that computation is not an intrinsic property of physical systems. 
Instead, it is an observer relative interpretation that we project on to various physical 
systems according to our interests and goals. And on such a view, computation per se 
is too weak to offer a theoretical criterion of mentality, since it fails to uniquely 
characterize and isolate the phenomenon in question.  
 
Searle contends that multiple realizability makes CTM conceptually bankrupt, since 
virtually any physical system can be interpreted as following virtually any program. 
Thus hurricanes, our digestive system, the motion of the planets, even an apparently 
inert lecture stand, all possess a level of description at which they instantiate any 
number of different programs – but it is absurd to attribute mental states or 
intelligence to them on that basis. Even though the stomach has inputs, internal 
processing states and outputs, it isn’t a cognitive system. Yet if one wanted to, one 
could interpret the inputs and outputs as code for any number of symbolic processes. 
And in his article ‘Is the Brain a Digital Computer’ [5] Searle attempts to illustrate the 
extreme conceptual looseness of the notion of implementing an abstract formalism by 
famously claiming that the molecules in his wall could be interpreted as running the 
Wordstar program. 
 
Let us label multiple realizability in this direction, wherein any given physical system 
can be interpreted as implementing an arbitrarily large number of different 
computational formalisms ‘upward MR’ and denote it as ‘↑MR’. The basic import of 
↑MR is the non-uniqueness of computational ascriptions to particular arrangements of 
matter and energy. In the extreme versions suggested by Putnam and Searle, there are 
apparently no significant constraints whatever – it is possible in principle to interpret 
every open physical system as realizing every computational procedure. Let us call 
this extreme version ‘universal upward MR’ and denote it as ‘↑MR*’. If every 
physical system can be construed as implementing every computational formalism, 
then clearly every computational formalism is realized by every physical system, and 
the corresponding position in the reverse direction, i.e. universal downward MR 
(↓MR*), is also true. So in this sense the two positions are equivalent and ↑MR* = 
↓MR*.   
 
But mere ↑MR is clearly weaker than ↑MR*, since the former does not assert that 
there are no salient constraints, and hence ↑MR would be consistent with the denial 
that, e.g., the molecules in Searle’s wall can in fact be interpreted as implementing the 
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Wordstar program (although every physical system might still be interpretable as 
implementing some exceedingly large set of distinct computations). What ↑MR 
denies is simply that any particular computational description that can be legitimately 
applied is somehow privileged or unique, and hence the relation in the direction from 
physical system to computational ascription is held to be irreducibly one-to-many. 
3.   Defending CTM 
In response to the Putnam/Searle universal realizability objection, various defenders 
of CTM attempt to block ↑MR* and/or its theoretical impact with two immediate and 
natural tactics. One (i) is to narrow the set of computations relevant, since only very 
complex and advanced procedures will be of any interest to CTM as candidates for 
mental architecture. Putnam’s initial proof involves inputless finite state automata, 
and these are commonly dismissed as too primitive. Full input/output capabilities are 
required, as well as rich internal processing structure, which calls for something on a 
par with, say, Jerry Fodor’s [6] Language of Thought (LOT) model of cognition. 
Hence in what follows it will be assumed that only formalisms comparable to TMs in 
general strength and complexity are under consideration.  
 
The second (ii) tactic is to place greater constraints on what counts as a legitimate 
physical realization. In line with this approach, David Chalmers [7] advocates what he 
takes to be two essential restrictions in distinguishing many of the ‘false’ cases of 
implementation required by Putnam’s argument, from ‘true’ cases consistent with a 
non-trivial reading of CTM. The first (iia) is an appropriate causal structure relating 
the state transitions in the physical implementation of the computational formalism 
(this is also proposed by, e.g. Ronald Chrisley [8]) , and the second (iib) is the ability 
of the mapping to support counterfactual sequences of transitions on inputs not 
actually given (which is also considered by Tim Maudlin [9]). Both of these are quite 
significant features inviting extended analysis, which unfortunately is not possible 
within the confines of the current discussion. However, selected points regarding each 
of these proffered constraints will be touched on below. 
 
Regarding point (iia), Chalmers argues that it is a necessary condition (for counting as 
a legitimate implementation) that the pattern of abstract state transitions constituting a 
particular run of the computational procedure on a particular input, must map to an 
appropriate transition of physical states of the machine, where the relation between 
succeeding states in this sequence is governed by proper causal regularities. This 
suggestion constitutes quite a natural and immediate corrective measure in response to 
the extreme laxity that might seem to underwrite ↑MR*, since the physical states in 
the chronological progression exploited by Putnam's method have no nomological 
connection. Nevertheless, I would argue that the constraint is too strong in general 
and rules out cases which should not be excluded. For example, in the Chinese room 
scenario, or indeed any situation where a human being is following an abstract 
computational procedure, the transition from one state to the next is not causal in any 
straightforward physical or mechanical sense. When I take a machine table set of 
instructions specifying a particular TM and then perform a given computation with 
pencil and paper by sketching the configuration of the tape at each step in the 
computation, the transitions sketched on the piece of paper are not themselves 
causally connected: one sketch in the sequence in no way causes the next. It is only 
through my understanding and intentional choice to execute the procedure that the 
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next state appears on the paper. Clear-cut physical causation of the sort required by 
Chalmers comes in only very indirectly, as in light rays illuminating the page and 
allowing me to see the symbols, and at an elementary and extraneous level, as in the 
friction between the pencil lead and the paper’s surface causing various marks to 
appear.  
 
Yet this is a perfectly legitimate and indeed paradigmatic case of implementing a 
Turing machine. And similarly in the Chinese room, it is merely through Searle’s 
understanding of English, his voluntary choice to behave in a certain manner, and a 
number of highly disjointed physical processes (finding bits of paper in a certain 
location, turning the pages in the instruction manual, all mediated by the human 
agent) that the implementation takes place. Searle, as an intentional agent, is choosing 
to cause various things to happen in accordance with a set of rules that he chooses to 
follow. And Searle's intentionally characterized behavior is not something that we 
currently have any hope of ever being able to recast in terms of causal regularities at 
the purely physical level of description.  
 
One might rejoin that, at least in principle, it's still theoretically possible to 
characterize the overall system purely in terms of natural laws and causal regularities, 
a la Dennett's [10] Martian superscientist, who doesn't require the intentional stance 
to predict human behavior. And while this may well be true in principle, I don't think 
it really helps, since we can't do so, and we're the ones interpreting Searle as 
performing a computation. Furthermore, we can let chance and randomness into the 
scenario. Suppose at each step in the computation Searle flips a coin, and will only 
follow the rule if the coin comes up heads. And suppose further that, for a particular 
run on an input question, the coin comes up heads every time and Searle successfully 
outputs the answer. He has still implemented the formalism, even though this outcome 
was not predictable on the basis of causal regularities or natural law.  
 
In this case it counts as an implementation simply because what can be interpreted as 
the appropriate states in the procedure occur in the correct linear order. Questions 
regarding the mechanics of how they happen to occur are not relevant to answering 
the question of whether or not the procedure has been implemented. In the Chinese 
Room we can know that the procedure has been implemented without knowing how 
Searle himself (or his brain) manages to do the requisite internal processing and 
control his limbs in order to make the correct marks on the slips of paper. The 
physical how is a different question, and is not on the same level of analysis as that 
invoked when determining whether or not the desired mapping from formalism to 
physical configuration obtains. But this then critically loosens the requirements for 
counting a physical system as instantiating a program. As long as what can be 
described or interpreted as the correct sequence of states actually occurs, then the 
underlying mechanics of how this takes place are not strictly relevant. 
 
The right sort of causal connections and regularities are needed if the instantiation in 
question is to be fully automatic, and if we want to be able to rely on the automatic 
device to perform systematically correct computations yielding outputs with the 
potential to supply us with new information. And although this is the engineering 
norm when constructing and interpreting computational artefacts, it does not exhaust 
the general space of possibilities. The causal requirements advocated by Chalmers 
constitute a sufficient but not a necessary condition – in the general case we must still 
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allow for chance and human agency to play a role, as well as chronological sequences 
of states that are not themselves governed by overarching causal regularities. Hence 
strategy (iia) does not successfully block the argument for ↑MR*. 
 
Chalmers’ proposed counterfactual requirement (iib) is aimed at another apparently 
‘slack’ feature incorporated by Putnam, viz. the mapping from formalism to physical 
system is defined for only a single run, and says nothing about what would have 
happened if a different input had been given. And it is objected that this is too weak to 
satisfy the more rigorous operational notion of being a ‘genuine’ realization. 
However, in response to Chalmers' (again quite natural) proposal, it is worth noting 
that for a physical system to realize a rich computational formalism with proper input 
and output capacities, such as an abstract TM, this will always be a matter of mere 
approximation. For example, any given physical device will have a finite upper bound 
on the size of input strings it is able to process, its storage capacities will likewise be 
severely limited, and so will its actual running time. In principle there are 
computations that formal TMs can perform which, even given the fastest and most 
powerful physical devices we could imagine, would take longer than the lifespan of 
our galaxy to execute. Hence even the fastest and most powerful physical devices we 
could envision will still fail to support all the salient counterfactuals. 
 
It will never be possible to construct a complete physical realization of an abstract TM 
– the extent to which the concrete device can execute the full range of state transitions 
of which the abstraction is capable will always be a matter of degree. So in turn, the 
class of counterfactual cases on alternative inputs with which the realization can cope 
is by necessity limited – not all counterfactual cases will be supported by any physical 
device implementing a TM. And this renders the appeal to counterfactuals 
unavoidably ad hoc. The restrictive strategy demands that the mapping be able to 
support counterfactual sequences of transitions on inputs not actually given - but 
precisely how many inputs not actually given? One, two, twenty million? There is no 
clear or principled cut off point demarking ‘genuine’ implementations from ‘false’ 
ones in terms of counterfactuals. Consider a standard pocket calculator that can intake 
numbers up to, say, 6 digits in decimal notion. Is this a ‘false’ realization of the 
corresponding algorithm for addition, since it can’t calculate 106 + 106? It’s an 
approximate instantiation which is nonetheless exceedingly useful for everyday sums. 
It will always be a matter of degree how many counterfactuals can be supported, 
where a single run on one input is the degenerate case. Where in principle can the line 
be drawn after that? It’s a matter of our purposes and goals as interpreters and 
epistemic agents, and is not an objective question about the ‘true’ nature of the 
physical device as an implementation. In some cases we might only be interested in 
the answer for a single input, a single run. 
 
Hence for a physical device to successfully ‘perform a computation’ is distinct from 
‘fully instantiating a computational formalism’. Performing a computation is an 
occurrent event, an actual sequence of physical state transitions yielding an output 
value, whereas instantiating a complete computational formalism is much more 
stringent and hypothetical, requiring appeal to counterfactuals, and as above, this will 
only obtain as a matter of degree. In light of this distinction, it is clearly possible for a 
physical device to successfully perform a computation without instantiating a 
complete computational formalism. And so again, tactic (iib) does not successfully 
rule out ↑MR* (nor weaker but extremely wide ranging versions of ↑MR). 
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4.    Observer Relativity 
One of Searle’s central negative claims is the allied notion that computation is not an 
‘intrinsic’ property of physical systems – instead it’s founded on an observer relative 
act of interpretation. This basic point has been objected to in different ways, and is 
itself in need of some clarification. The latter part of Searle’s claim may seem to 
suggest that it is a purely capricious and subjective matter, and Ned Block [11] 
objects by pointing out that it’s simply not the case that anything goes. As an 
illustration, he notes that, although it’s possible to reinterpret an inclusive OR gate as 
an AND gate by flipping our interpretations of the values of ‘0’ and ‘1’, it is still not 
possible to reinterpret an inclusive OR gate as an exclusive OR gate. So although we 
have a great deal of latitude about how we interpret a material device, there are also 
very important restrictions on this freedom, and according to Block, this makes it a 
substantive claim that, e.g., the human brain is a computer of a certain sort.  
 
Block’s position suggests that there are two important strands here that need to be 
separated. ‘Observer relative’ could mean that it’s totally subjective and anything 
goes, which is the claim he wants to deny. But it could also mean something more 
curtailed, viz., that computation is not an objective, observer independent feature of 
any given arrangement of matter and energy, and hence that no such description 
follows from nor is implicated by a purely physical account. Instead, the attribution of 
computational activity requires an observer to project the interpretation onto the 
system in question, and in this sense it is observer dependent. This doesn’t mean that 
the interpretation doesn’t have to satisfy various objective constraints supplied by the 
given characterization of the system. It simply means that, as Searle also says, it’s not 
intrinsic to the system itself, qua physical mechanism, and must be provided by the 
observer as an additional, outside ascription.  
 
At this point an objector might reply that there are many levels of description that are 
not ‘intrinsic’ from the perspective of fundamental physics, but are nonetheless 
perfectly legitimate and scientifically respectable. For example, various arrangements 
of matter and energy configured in such a way as to perform some clear biological 
function. ‘Being a kidney’ is not an intrinsic property of the collection of molecules 
comprising a given instance of an organ of this kind, but this is still an objective and 
scientifically rigorous categorization. In response, I would argue that the attribution of 
computational structure is crucially disanalogous to cases such as this, which still 
trade on characteristics which are themselves essentially physical in nature. In order 
to be a kidney, a particular assemblage of material stuff must do things with other 
instances of material stuff that are characterized in terms of, e.g. the chemical 
composition of blood, waste products, filtering, etc. There is an objective, observer 
independent fact of the matter regarding whether or not a given configuration of 
matter performs the chemically specified functions required of kidneys, because 
biological functions are defined in terms of cause and effect relations in the physical 
world, and in stark contrast, computational realizations are not. There is a pronounced 
difference here between actual versus abstract characteristics which makes 
attributions of computational structure entirely observer dependent in a manner not 
shared by biological functions. The inputs to a computational system are essentially 
'symbolic' rather than physical, where the material implementations of the symbolic or 
formal inputs must be interpreted as such by an outside agent, and where this 
symbolic interpretation is entirely conventional in nature. This marks a pronounced 
discontinuity in levels of description.  
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At the abstract, formal level, computation is essentially a syntactic phenomenon, and 
how we choose to interpret arrangements of matter and energy as constituting, say, 
tokens of an abstract syntactic type, and thus specifying an implementation of the 
basic computational vocabulary, is entirely independent of physical composition. For 
example, there is a more or less limitless diversity in the ways that material patterns 
and arrangements can be viewed as implementing the binary notation of '0' and '1', 
from ink marks on a piece of paper, stones placed in wooden boxes, patterns on old 
fashioned punch cards, electric voltages, beer cans positioned on rolls of toilet 
paper,... And as we've already seen, this scales up in the reverse ↑MR direction 
wherein the same stones placed in wooden boxes can be interpreted as implementing 
any number of distinct computational structures. Hence it’s easy to reinterpret an 
inclusive OR gate as an AND gate – there is no objective fact to the matter as to 
which truth function is being computed. In light of Block's objection, some 
interpretations appear to be excluded (on the very pivotal assumption that the physical 
system itself is characterized as an ‘inclusive OR gate’ and not as something more 
fundamental), which seems to cast some doubt on ↑MR*. In the ensuing discussion I 
will not argue for or against ↑MR* (see Mark Bishop [12-13] for an interesting 
version of the claim) but instead confine my attention to the more modest, but 
nonetheless still vastly permissive ↑MR.  
 
The non-intrinsic nature of computation would seem to follow as a direct consequence 
of the comparatively weak ↑MR, since ↑MR alone critically undermines the notion 
that any given computational interpretation of a physical device is somehow 
privileged or unique. As long as there are always at least two distinct interpretations, 
then there is no objective fact of the matter regarding which computation is ‘really’ 
being performed. And indeed, even if ↑MR* were to turn out false and some 
computational interpretations are excluded for a particular physical system, it remains 
the case that, as opposed to merely two, there are yet arbitrarily many distinct 
interpretations which are not excluded. Computation is not an intrinsic property of the 
physical device, but instead is founded on an act of human interpretation, and is 
usually tethered to issues involving design and engineering, relative to our purposes 
and interests. Indeed, discrete states themselves are idealizations, since the physical 
processes that we interpret as performing computations are in fact continuous, and 
this fundamental building block of digital procedures must be projected on to the 
natural world from the start. Thus implementation is always a matter of both 
interpretation and degree of approximation, and its usefulness will depend on our 
interests and epistemic needs (e.g. as above - how big a set of counterfactual inputs 
we want it to be able to compute). 
 
It’s certainly true that there is no pragmatic value in most interpretive exercises 
compatible with ↑MR and ↑MR*, e.g. post hoc attributions of single runs, or any case 
where we know the outcomes in advance of the interpretation. Physically instantiated 
computation is useful to us only insofar as it supplies informative outputs, which in 
most cases will come down to new data acquired as a result of the implemented 
calculation. Interesting observer relative computation takes place when we can 
directly read-off something that follows from the formalism, but which we didn’t 
already know in advance and explicitly incorporate into the mapping from the start. 
That’s the incredible value of our computational artefacts, and it’s the only practical 
motivation for playing the interpretation game in the first place  
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Of course, this doesn’t mean that we cannot ascribe other interpretations to the same 
artefact – the difference is that in most cases the outputs will then be of no pragmatic 
or epistemic value to us. But this is still something relative to our human interests, 
practices and goals – the success of the strategy is based on objective features of the 
system (typically that we have designed and built), but this does not make 
computation itself intrinsic – it is still a purely conventional interpretation, an abstract 
level of description, and as such is neither canonical nor unique. Indeed, computation 
is no more an intrinsic property of a physical systems than is ‘being a sequence of 
inscriptions constituting a formal derivation of a theorem in first-order logic’. 
 
In line with this logic/formal proof example, when I execute a particular TM 
computation by drawing the initial tape configuration on a piece of paper, then write 
down the succeeding tape configuration for each step in the computation according to 
the instructions in the machine table until I reach a halting configuration and stop, the 
physical states realizing the computation are a sequence of scratch marks on a two 
dimensional sheet of paper. There is nothing physical about these scratched in 
patterns that is intrinsically computational – indeed, the shapes could be interpreted in 
any manner one likes, or not at all. The computational interpretation of the physical 
scratch mark is purely extrinsic. And this is the same for syntactic interpretations in 
general – e.g. being an instance of the spoken English sentence ‘The cat is on the mat’ 
is not an intrinsic property of the sound waves constituting an instantiating utterance. 
Classical computation is rule governed syntax manipulation, and it is no more 
intrinsic to physical configurations than is syntax itself. And again, this was explicitly 
noted by Turing [2] long ago.  
 
Physical systems, as such, are governed by physical laws, while formal systems are 
intrinsically rule governed.  In the case of our computational artefacts, a system 
governed by physical laws must be deliberately engineered so that it can be 
interpreted as isomorphic in the relevant sense to a chosen rule governed formal 
system. 'Obedience' to physical law is an essentially descriptive matter and there is no 
sense in which mistakes or error can be involved – natural laws cannot be broken, and 
the time evolution of material systems is wholly determined (in the classical case at 
least) by the laws in question. On the other hand, 'obedience' to formal rules is an 
essentially normative matter, and there is a vital sense in which error and malfunction 
can occur. If my desk top machine is dosed with petrol and set on fire while still in 
operation, the time evolution of the hardware will remain in perfect descriptive accord 
with natural law. However, it will very soon fail to comply with the normative 
requirements of implementing Microsoft Word, and serious computational 
malfunctions will ensue. Being an implementation of Microsoft Word is a normative 
and provisional interpretation of the hardware system, which can be withdrawn when 
something goes ‘wrong’ or when the system is disrupted by non-design intended 
forces - being an implementation of Microsoft Word is not intrinsic to the physical 
structure itself.  
5.     Computation and Consciousness 
Many versions of CTM focus solely on the functional analysis of propositional 
attitude states such as belief and desire, and simply ignore other aspects of the mind, 
most notably consciousness and qualitative experience – Fodor’s LOT is a classic 
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case in point. However others, such as William Lycan [14], try to extend the reach of 
Strong AI and the computational paradigm, and contend that conscious states arise via 
the implementation of the appropriate computational formalism. This then invites 
reapplication of the Putnam/Searle line in the ↓MR* direction, with the rejoinder that 
every open physical system implements the ‘appropriate computational formalism’, so 
that consciousness is everywhere. According to this polemical strategy, rampant 
panpsychism follows as a consequence of CTM extended to the explanation of 
consciousness (which will be dubbed ‘CTM+’), and this is taken as a reductio ad 
absurdum refutation of such views. 
 
A natural line of defense for CTM+ is to invoke the counterfactual constraint 
discussed in section 3. to try and rule out unwanted implementations. Only highly 
sophisticated physical systems (such as brains, presumably) are able to support all the 
counterfactuals required to count as an implementation of the appropriate 
computational formalism, and hence the attempted panpsychic reductio is blocked. 
But as Maudlin and Bishop have argued, this is a highly dubious strategy in the case 
of conscious states, since these are essentially occurrent phenomena, and the 
invocation of non-occurrent process seems tantamount to summoning occult forces. 
While it's true that our conceptual analysis of 'causation', 'natural law', etc., invokes 
the notion of counterfactuals, this is an entirely different issue to the question at hand. 
Regardless of the abstract modal and other conceptual machinery required for 
philosophical analysis, it is still not the case that what is said to happen in a relevant 
counterfactually possible world has any causal efficacy in this world. So even though 
consciousness may involve causation, and counterfactuals are invoked in the 
philosophical analysis of the concept of causation, it still does not follow that 
conscious states can be affected in any way by things that might have happened but 
didn't. As Bishop rightly observes, the appeal to counterfactuals apparently requires a 
non-physical link between non-entered states and the resulting conscious experiences 
of the system. 
 
Hence I would agree that for conscious states counterfactuals don’t matter – it’s only 
the actual run that could have any bearing, so that the foregoing attempted defense of 
CTM+ is unsuccessful. However, at this juncture a critic might reply that the 
occurrent character of consciousness should not in itself present a problem that 
wouldn't apply to any mental process, e.g. thinking (I would like to thank an 
anonymous reviewer for raising this and several other points pertaining to 
consciousness). And my view is that if 'thinking' is treated as an occurrent mental 
process, then the same observations as above do hold - no progression of an actual, 
temporally extended thought process can be causally influenced by what might have 
taken place but didn't. Counterfactual states of affairs still have no causal efficacy in 
the actual world.  
 
Additionally, I would argue that the computational account of consciousness is 
fundamentally wrong in any case, and that even given the implementation of all 
purportedly relevant counterfactuals, this would still not constitute a sufficient 
condition for the presence of conscious experience. And this is because, as argued 
above, computation is not an intrinsic property of physical systems, and so is 
inherently unsuited to serve as the foundation for consciousness, which should instead 
be based on intrinsic properties of the brain as a physical mechanism. So to return to 
the example of thinking, there's an important distinction to be drawn between the 
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conscious and the non-conscious aspects of thought. If by 'thought process' we're 
talking in CTM terms about the occurrent physical realization of a computational 
procedure, then this is an abstract level of description of the physical process 
realizing the computation, while it's the underlying causal powers of the physical 
medium that are responsible for the actual progression from state to state. And as just 
argued above, the intrinsic powers/properties of the physical medium should also be 
held responsible for the conscious aspect of thinking, and, contra CTM+, it is not the 
abstract computational procedure which sustains consciousness. 
 
Unlike computational formalisms, conscious states are inherently non-abstract; they 
are actual, occurrent phenomena extended in physical time (whereas only the physical 
implementation of formal procedures is temporally extended). The computational 
camp makes a critical error by espousing ↓MR as a hallmark of their theory, while at 
the same time contending that qualitatively identical conscious states are maintained 
across wildly different kinds of physical realization. The latter is the claim that an 
actual, substantive and invariant phenomenon is preserved over radically diverse real 
systems, while the former entails the claim that no internal physical regularities need 
to be preserved. And this is because, as noted at the start of the paper when the notion 
of ↓MR was introduced, what unites different types of physical implementation of the 
same abstract formalism is nothing that they have in common as physical systems, but 
rather a structural isomorphism characterized at a higher level of description. Hence 
it’s possible to implement the very same computational formalism using modern 
electronic circuitry, a human being executing the instructions by hand with paper and 
pencil, a Victorian system of gears and levers, as well as more atypical arrangements 
of matter and energy including toilet paper and beer cans. There are no internal 
physical regularities preserved over electronic circuitry, gears and levers, and toilet 
paper and beer cans. And hence there is no actual, occurrent factor which could serve 
as the causal substrate or supervenience base for the substantive and invariant 
phenomenon of internal conscious experience. The advocate of CTM+ cannot rejoin 
that it is formal role which supplies this basis, since formal role is abstract, and such 
abstract features can only be instantiated via actual properties, but they do not have 
the power to produce them.  
 
The only (possible) non-abstract effects that instantiated formalisms are required to 
preserve must be specified in terms of their input/output profiles, and thus internal 
experiences, qua actual events, are in principle omitted. Hence (as has also been 
argued elsewhere: see Schweizer [15-16]) it would appear that the non-abstract, 
occurrent nature of conscious states entails that they must depend upon intrinsic 
properties of the brain as a proper subsystem of the actual world. It is worth noting 
that from this it does not follow that other types of physical subsystem could not share 
the relevant intrinsic properties and hence also support conscious states. It only 
follows that they would have this power in virtue of their intrinsic physical properties 
and not in virtue of being interpretable as implementing the same abstract 
computational procedure. 
 
6.     Observer Dependency and CTM 
In the remaining discussion I propose that we restrict CTM to the schematic belief-
desire framework commonly assumed to characterize intentional systems, and leave 
conscious experience out of its purview. Within this restricted context, I argue that it 
is possible to give an account of how this type of approach could, at least in principle, 
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offer us an effective theoretical handle on the mind, even if we accept Searle's view 
that computation is not an intrinsic property of physical systems. The classical 
paradigm in cognitive science derives from Turing’s basic model of computation as 
rule governed transformations on a set of syntactical elements, and it has taken 
perhaps its most literal form of expression in terms of Fodor’s aforementioned 
Language of Thought hypothesis, wherein mental processes are explicitly viewed as 
formal operations on a linguistically structured system of internal symbols. So in the 
present discussion I will use the LOT as a very clear illustration of the classical 
approach, although the basic points made do not depend on the specific details of the 
LOT per se. According to the LOT, propositional attitude states, such as belief and 
desire, are treated as computational relations to sentences in an internal processing 
language, and where the LOT sentence serves to represent or encode the propositional 
content of the intentional state. Symbolic representations are thus posited as the 
internal structures that carry the information utilized by intelligent systems, and they 
also comprise the formal elements over which cognitive computations are performed. 
According to the traditional and widely accepted belief-desire framework of 
psychological explanation, an agent’s actions are both caused and explained by 
intentional states such as belief and desire. And on the LOT model, these states are 
sustained via sentences in the head that are formally manipulated by the cognitive 
processes which lead to actions.  
 
Fodor plausibly notes that particular tokens of these LOT sentences could well turn 
out to be specific neuronal configurations or brain states. The formal syntax of LOT 
thus plays a crucial triad of roles: it can represent meaning, it’s the medium of 
cognitive computation, and it can be physically realized. So the syntax of LOT can in 
principle supply a link between the high level intentional description of a cognitive 
agent, and the actual neuronal process that enjoy causal efficacy. This triad of roles 
allows content bearing states, such as propositional attitudes, to explain salient pieces 
of behavior, such as bodily motions, if the intermediary syntax is seen as realized in 
neurophysiological configurations of the brain. Because the tokens of LOT are 
semantically interpretable and physically realizable, they form a key theoretical 
bridge between content and causation. In this manner, a very elegant (possible) 
answer is supplied to the longstanding theoretical question of how mental states 
individuated in terms of their content could be viewed as causes of actual behaviour, 
without violating fundamental conservation laws in physics. This is a specialized 
instance of the general solution to the problem of mental causation supplied by the 
computational paradigm which was noted in section 2. In this respect the LOT 
constitutes a very fine grained version of the general approach, wherein the internal 
processing structure involved explicitly reflects the standard belief-desire framework 
of traditional psychological explanation. 
 
If we take something like Fodor’s LOT (for the sake of illustration), this is at least the 
basic type of highly sophisticated and complex computational structure relevant to 
CTM. Propositional attitudes themselves are abstract, dispositional states, and their 
functional/computational rendition could in principle be interpreted as a 
computational level of description of the activities of the human brain. Unlike 
occurrent conscious states viewed in purely qualitative terms, content laden 
propositional attitudes are highly dispositional in character, and for such abstract, 
dispositional states, the relevant counterfactuals pertaining to formal processing 
structure do matter. For example, if some agent is purported to instantiate the 
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propositional attitude of believing that snow is white, then if given as input the 
question 'Is snow white?' an affirmative response such as 'yes' is required as output. 
But this is clearly not sufficient for implementing the belief that snow is white, and a 
host of counterfactual input/output patterns would also need to be supported, such as, 
if the agent had been asked 'Is snow green?' the output would have been 'No', if asked 
'What color is snow?' the answer would have been 'White', etc., etc. So a version of 
Chalmer's counterfactual constraint is applicable in this more specialized case, but the 
reason is due to the prior conceptual requirements of instantiating a propositional 
attitude itself, rather than a computational formalism per se. These counterfactual 
constraints must be satisfied by any system held to properly sustain a belief or desire, 
and this is independent of the choice of CTM as the particular theory used to account 
for the underlying mechanics of how this takes place.    
 
In line with the discussion in previous sections, even if, for the sake of argument, we 
grant that the brain can be interpreted as implementing Fodor’s LOT, still, this would 
not be an intrinsic property of the brain as a biochemical mechanism. Obviously, there 
would be no scientific interest in a mere ad hoc mapping from LOT onto the brain, 
although in principle this may be possible, a la ↓MR*. Instead, for a theoretically 
substantive approach, there would be a myriad of pre-existing and empirically 
intransigent ‘wet-ware’ constraints that the mapping would have to satisfy, in order to 
respect the salient causal structure of brain activity as discovered by neuroscience. 
The largely independent body of functional and anatomical data from neuroscience 
would supply a host of highly non-trivial restrictions on how the physical system 
itself is characterized and what the material state transitions should look like that are 
interpreted as implementations of the abstract computational procedures. A 
scientifically significant mapping is not free to view the arrangement of matter and 
energy comprising the human brain in terms of brain-irrelevant aspects such as 
cosmic ray bombardment, gravitational fields, arbitrary molecular kinetics, etc. 
Instead, it must restrict itself to salient causal factors pertaining to the physical 
system's time-evolution when viewed as a brain. So a version of Chalmers' causal 
regularities between states would in fact obtain in this more regimented and 
specialized case, because, like a standard computational artefact, the brain must 
perform the implemented computational procedures automatically and reliably.  
 
If a physical system when viewed as a brain were methodically interpretable as 
implementing the LOT, this would entail that the transitions between the various 
neurological states instantiating respective tokens of mentalese symbols, obeyed a 
causal progression in accord with the transformation of these symbols as prescribed 
by the abstract computational formalism. If this could be done, it would provide a 
scientifically fruitful and explanatorily powerful key to organic cognition, because it 
would constitute a unifying perspective tying together actual brain function and the 
standard belief-desire framework of intentional explanation. As above, the abstract 
computational level of description has the potential of supplying a bridge between 
content bearing propositional attitude states and causally efficacious physical 
mechanisms. And if a rigorous and explicit mapping could be specified, then it would 
appear that such a bridge had been found. 
 
This abstract computational interpretation of brain activity would also need to mesh 
with the salient input and output capabilities that we want to explain via the 
attribution of internal cognitive structure, to explain, e.g. intelligent linguistic 
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performance as in a Turing test. So from a purely physical perspective, the inputs and 
outputs are various forms of energy bombarding the organism’s surface and 
emanating from it, and are not intrinsically computational either. But on the non-
intrinsic cognitive level, these would be viewed as instances of written and spoken 
language, for example. And when interpreted as such, this non-intrinsic syntactic level 
would correspond to the internal processing activity triggered by the incoming energy 
pulse, interpreted as, say, a sentence in an English conversation. And this would have 
to conform with observable input and output patterns interpreted symbolically, to 
yield successful predictions of both new outputs given novel inputs, and predictions 
correctly describing new brain configurations entailed by the theory as realizations of 
the appropriate formal transformations required to produce the predicted output.  
 
If successful, this would indeed be a case of real science, with at least two primary 
levels of empirical constraint satisfaction and experimental testing, to substantiate or 
refute the accuracy of the proposed mapping between formalism and brain structure. 
First there is the level of brute input and output profiles, which can be experimentally 
scrutinized in terms of outputs predicted by the formalism given new inputs. In this 
manner, a very wide range of counterfactual capabilities can become actualized over 
time. Second, the internal brain processes mediating input and output must preserve 
the interpretation of computational state transitions in accord with the formalism, and 
again, experimentation can allow many counterfactuals to be probed. Additionally, 
the linguistic interpretation of input and output signals would have to mesh with 
corresponding objects and states of affairs in the agent’s environment, since in the 
human LOT case, we are studying and explaining an environmentally embedded 
system, and not a solipsistic syntax manipulator (such as a chatbot, for example). So if 
this CTM project were to turn out successful, then the LOT would be as powerful and 
well confirmed as a scientific venture could hope to be, and the objection that 
computation is still not an ‘intrinsic’ property of the brain would fade into irrelevance. 
It is in virtue of all of these factors considered together that human cognition could 
plausibly be accounted for in computational terms, and not simply in virtue of the 
brain being (in-principle) interpretable as realizing the LOT, by appeal to a mapping 
that ignores these crucial factors.  
7.    Conclusion 
In accord with Searle, computation should be viewed as an extrinsic, observer 
dependent feature of physical systems. As such, it does not constitute a stable or 
independent natural kind. Various natural phenomena can be modelled or simulated 
using computational techniques, but this is to be distinguished from the notion that the 
system itself spontaneously instantiates and executes a computational procedure. 
Physical systems can be interpreted as realizing various abstract formalisms, but such 
realization is essentially a matter of approximation and degree, and interpreting a 
physical device as performing a computation is always relative to our purposes and 
potential epistemic gains. Configurations of matter and energy are governed by 
natural law, and computational modelling simulates this in a fundamentally 
descriptive manner. In contrast, formal procedures are essentially normative, rule 
governed structures, and in principle this interpretation can be projected onto natural 
systems in an almost limitless variety of ways. However, interesting and illuminating 
cases of computation realized in the physical world will come down to a question of 
engineering, either artificial or perhaps biological, in order to attain a robust, 
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informative, non post hoc constraint satisfying degree of fit as a level of description 
for a physical system. 
 
It is conceivable that the human brain has been biologically engineered such that there 
exist interesting, informative and predictively successful levels of computational 
description in the above sense. Propositional attitudes are at least potentially 
explainable in terms of functional/computational structure, which is abstract and 
multiply realizable. In contrast, conscious states, if they occur in a given 
implementation, should be explained in terms of the intrinsic physical properties of 
the medium of instantiation. In this manner, conscious experiences are properly seen 
as hardware states that may play an abstract functional role. This abstract role 
remains a legitimate software concern, and it must be preserved across divergent 
realizations. But the purely qualitative aspects of temporally extended conscious 
states should be seen as features of the particular material substrate that implements 
this role on a given occasion, and these features are not guaranteed to be preserved 
across divergent types of physical realization. Hence I would conclude that Searle’s 
basic point against CTM is not well taken. Although CTM+ and a purely 
computational theory of consciousness are ruled out, in the case of propositional 
attitude states, the non-intrinsic status of computation does not trivialize predictively 
successful ascriptions of formal structure, and multiple realizability on its own, even 
in the extreme case of ↑MR*, does not render CTM empirically vacuous.  
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